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Abstract 
The paper is devoted to developing methods for control of ecological-economic systems consisting of three 
hierarchically subordinate subjects of control. In describing the dynamics of a system state, equations in partial 
derivatives that are solved numerically according to a semi-implicit scheme of the finite-diơerence method are used. 
To achieve its main goal, the subject of control of the upper level applies diơerent control methods. Methods of 
hierarchical control that diơer in the direction of action are proposed. At last a comparative analysis of the obtained 
results is made. 
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1. Introduction 
Today, some economic regions are on the verge of an ecological catastrophe. As finance of 
environmental protection is decreasing, problems of environmental safety are getting more and more 
acute. This specifies the necessity for forecasting changes of the state of an ecological syst em, 
assessments of consequences of made decisions for the environment. Therefore, the development of 
control mechanisms for complex ecological-economic systems is one of the burning tasks .In the last 
decades, in analyzing ecological-economic systems is used the notion of hierarch ically controlled 
dynamic systems [1] in whose concept a specific character of control mechanis ms for real ecological-
economic objects is taken into consideration. The simplest hierarchically controlled dynamic system is a 
two-level system studied in [2-5]. 
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This paper analyzing ecological-economic systems are used three-level systems that more exact ly 
describe the structure of modern control systems for ecological-economic systems; methods of 
hierarchical control that allow achieving a stable development of an eco logical subsystem are proposed . 
The main goal of the study is to define optimal standards of distribution of environmental contamination 
penalty for the center government among budgets of diơ erent levels. The solution to this problem may 
help justify existing standards or develop new ones. 
2. Mathematical formulation of the problem 
Let along the river there be N  industrial enterprises (IE) that discharge contaminants (C) into the 
river. Discharged C are for convenience divided into carbon and nit rogen -bearing. IE pay  penalties for 
discharge of contaminants into the waterway. Hierarch ical three-level systems of river water quality 
control that involve sources of action of the upper (center government -CG), intermediate (local 
government-LG), and lower (enterprise-IE) levels and controlled dynamic system (CDS or waterway). It 
is assumed that relat ions between the elements of the system under study are organized as follows: CG 
acts on LG, LG acts on IE, IE acts on CDS. In the system, the presence of feedback is assumed : 
informat ion about the current state of CDS comes to all subjects of control. CG must maintain CDS in 
stable state but cannot act on it  directly. The indirect act ion of CG on CDS is in  defining what part of 
money obtained from IE in the form of payment for discharge of contaminants into the waterway comes 
to LG. The task of CG is to create conditions under which it would be profitable for LG and IE, 
maximizing money that they receive, to stick to the fixed  standards of quality of river and waste water. 
beside maintaining CDS in stable state, it  tends to define optimal standards of penalty distribution among 
budgets of diơ erent levels, i.e., maximize the objective function of the form 
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Here t  is a t ime coordinate; ( ( )m m mi i iT F T  is a size o f payment per unit of d ischarged carbon and 
nitrogen-bearing ( m c  and m n  respectively) C on the i th IE at the instant t ; ((1 ( )m m mi i iW P W  
is an amount of C discharged into the river by the i th IE before (after) purification of waste water per 
time unit  ( ,m n c ); ( )miP t  is a share of carbon and nitrogen-bearing ( m c  and m n  respectively) 
C removed on the i th IE in the process of waste water purification; C)  is an expenditure function of CG 
on the improvement of river water quality dependent on the total amount of C discharged into the river; 
'  is an instant up to which the examination is being made; , ( )c niH t  is a share of payment of TP for 
discharge of contaminants into the waterway that rest with CG in the budget at the instant t . LC tend to 
maximize money , their objective function has the form 
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where 0C  is an LC expenditure function on the improvement of river water quality; ( , )miq m n c  are 
minimal admissible purification rates of waste water per IE that are among the constraints on IE controls. 
In the functions 0C  and C)  are reflected material losses of the society and regions due to contaminated 
water. The goal of IE is to maximize its profit, i.e., 
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Here ( )m mp iC P  is an expenditure function of the i th IE on purification of a unit o f dis charged 
contaminants from n itrogen and carbon-bearing ( m c  and m n  respectively) C; i)  are production 
funds; ( )i iR )  is a production function of the i th IE; ( )iZ t  is a profit of IE from realization of a unit of 
produced products at the instant t . 
Dynamics of the change of production funds of the i th IE is described by an equation 
                          0; (0) ; 1,..., .i i i
d k Y const i N
dt
)   )  )  )                              (2.4) 
where ik  is a coeﬃcient of amort izat ion of production funds; iY are investments that can be considered 
both a constant quantity and a variable dependent on the p rofit obtained by IE. 
Let the total number of discharged C linearly depends on the number of products produced at IE and 
their production functions have the form ( ,m n c ) 
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The main characteristics of the river water quality, namely, concentration of carbon and nitrogen 
biochemical consumption of oxygen ( ,c nB B ) and concentration of oxygen dissolved in water ( oB )in 
case of spatial inhomogeneity only along the stream canal is described by the following equations: 
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where x  is a spatial coordinate; 0 x Ld d ; L  is a  river length; E  is a d ispersion coeﬃcient; A  is a  
square of the river cross-section; 
x
v  is a  velocity of water in the river; ( )n
n
k B , ( )c
c
k B  is a  variation 
with t ime of carbon and nitrogen biochemical consumption of oxygen due to dissociation; 
[ ]O OO sutK B B  is an addition of dissolved oxygen due to reaeration; OsutB  is a concentration of oxygen 
saturation; 0F  is an addition due to photosynthesis; 1F  is consumption of dissolved oxygen on 
respiration; 2F  is bottom consumption of dissolved oxygen. Problems (2.1)–(2.3) are solved under the 
following constraints on the controls ( 1,..., ;0 ; ,i N t m c n d d '  ): 
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where the value o f the quantity H  is defined by technological capabilities of IE in waste water 
purification; the values of 
max
( , )mT m n c 
 are specified. 
We know state standards for C concentration in the waterway, for concentration of oxygen dissolved 
in water ( 0 td d ' ) 
                                      
max min0 ; ; ,
m m o OB B B B m n cd d d  
                                               (2.11) 
and quality of waste water discharged into the waterway ( 0 td d ' ) 
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where 0 ( )iQ t  is water consumption at the i th IE at the instant t ; the quantities maxmB , minoB , maxQ  are 
specified. 
A model described by system of equations and inequalities (2.1)–(2.12) is studied. 
3. Methods of hierarchical control 
The problem is posed correctly if CG has suﬃcient economic leverages on LG, i.e ., the quantities 
1( , ; 1,..., )miH m n c i N    make strategies that allow fulfilling conditions (2.11), (2.12) at optimal 
reactions of IE economically profitable. In modern control systems, two basic mechanisms of control are 
used: normative and adaptive [4]. Diﬀerent mechanisms correspond to diﬀerent methods of hierarch ical 
control that diﬀer from each other by a direction of action. 
3.1 Enforcement 
In case of enforcement, LG act on the range of admissible controls of IE by choosing min imal 
admissible degrees of waste water purification. The amount of payment for discharge of contaminants is 
constant. 
The Algorithm for Constructing an Enforcement Equilibrium 
(1) As a result of min imization of (2.3) with constraints (2.8), optimal strategies of IE are defined 
depending on controls of LG 
*( ) ( , ); , ; 1,..., .m m mi i iP T q m n c i N   
(2) The optimal strategies for IE obtained in item 1 of the algorithm are substituted into (2.2). Then 
maximization of criterion (2.2) in the quantities { } 1;( , )m Ni iq m n c   is made at fixed miT  with 
constraints (2.9). As a result, optimal controls for subjects of control are defined depending on the 
strategy of CG 
*( ) ( ); , ; 1,..., .m mi iq H m n c i N   
(3) Criterion (2.1) is maximized into which are substituted the functions obtained at the previous teps 
of the algorithm with constraints (2.10). For CG, the optimal quantities are ( , )miH m n c , that deliver a 
maximal income to it under fulfilled conditions (2.11), (2.12). 
(4) then the enforcement equilibrium is defined by equalities  
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Otherwise, at least, equalities  
*
* *
( ) 1; ( ) ( ) 1 ; , .m m mi i iH q p m n cH      
 are fulfilled at some instant. 
3.2 Motivation 
In this case, LG acts on objective functions of IE assigning the size o f payment for units of 
discharged C. The construction of the motivation equilibrium has sens e if conditions (2.11), (2.12)are nor 
fulfilled at ( , ; 1,..., )m mi iP q m n c i N   . Otherwise, we should speak of enforcement. 
The Algorithm for Constructing the Motivation Equilibrium 
(1) Similar to the enforcement method, optimal strategies for IE are defined depending on LG. 
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(2) In the motivation method, criterion (2.2), in which the quantities ( , )miP m n c   are functions of 
m
iT  and are defined at the first step of the algorithm, are maximized in 1{ ( )} ; ,m m Ni i iT T m n c  . We shall 
denote optimal strategies of LG through *( ) ( ); , ; 1,...,m mi iT T m n c i N  . 
(3) Criterion (2.1) is maximized, in it we have 
* * *( ) ( ,(( ) ); ( ) ( ); , .m m m m m m mi i i i i i iP P q T T T T m n c    
Optimal quantities for CG are the quantities 1{( )} ; ,m Ni iT m n c  that deliver a maximal income  to 
government under fulfilled conditions (2.11), (2.12). 
(4) We shall define the motivation equilibrium as a set of quantities  
*
* * 1{( ) ,( ) ( ) } ; ,m m m Ni i i iH T P m n c   
Where * *
* * * *
( ) ( ) (( ) );( ) ( ) (( ) ).m m m m m m mi i i i i i iT T H P P T q   
3.3. Persuasion 
In using this method of control, we assume that LC and IE understand the importance of the problem 
of improvement the ecological situation in  the reg ion and tend to fulfill conditions (2.11),  (2.12). In p lace 
of criteria (2.1)–(2.3), all subjects of control have one criterion ( 0; , ; 1,...,miq m n c i N   ) 
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considered with conditions and relations (2.4)–(2.8), (2.11), (2.12). 
4. Conclusions  
In case of enforcement, it is profitable for IE so that the size of payment for discharge of contaminants 
is, on the one hand, greater than some quantity 
max
G ; on the other hand, smaller than the quantities 
max
G .There may be a situation when the enforcement method is being realized but the mot ivation is not. 
The use of three or more h ierarch ically related levels in the control system must be guided by the 
complexity, versatility of control problems being solved, impossibility of their solution with the use of 
two levels of control only. Otherwise, the presence of addit ional levels is not justified from the  economic 
viewpoint. In real ecological-economic systems, the use of intermediate levels of control and choice of a 
method of hierarchical control must follow from the character of the system and problems that a subject 
of control of the upper level faces. 
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